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LOVE GAMES
A GAME THEORY APPROACH TO COMPATIBILITY
KERSTIN BEVER AND JULIE ROWLETT
Abstract. In this note, we present a compatibility test based on John
Nash’s game-theoretic notion of equilibrium strategy. The test must be
taken separately by both partners, making it difficult for either partner
alone to control the outcome. The mathematics behind the test includ-
ing Nash’s celebrated theorem and an example from the film, “A Beau-
tiful Mind,” are discussed as well as how to customize the test for more
accurate results and how to modify the test to evaluate interpersonal
relationships in other settings, not only romantic. To investigate the
long-term dynamics of give and take in a relationship we introduce the
“iterated dating dilemma” and apply the notion of “zero-determinant
payoff strategy” introduced by Dyson and Press in 2012 for the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma.
1. Introduction
“Are you ready to settle down?” “Are you in love or forcing it?” These are
the titles of compatibility quizzes found in Cosmopolitan magazine [7]. The
“Love Calculator” featured in Glamour magazine [2] claims to determine
whether “you and he add up” or are “destined for a long division?” These
and most other compatibility quizzes we have seen in popular culture do
not appear to have a rigorous scientific basis and are often easy to cheat to
control the test results.
We have created a compatibility test based on sound mathematical princi-
ples and John Nash’s notion of equilibrium strategy. The test must be taken
separately by both partners, making it difficult for either partner alone to
control the outcome.
This note is organized as follows. In §2, we introduce Nash’s notion of
equilibrium strategy and investigate an example from popular culture. Our
test comprises §3. In §4, we show how to evaluate the test, and we also
show how the test can be modified to provide more accurate results or to
evaluate non-romantic relationships, for example in professional or political
settings. In the last section of this note, we explore the long-term dynamics
of give and take in a relationship using a variation of the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma (IPD) and Dyson’s and Press’s 2012 discovery of “zero determinant
payoff strategies for the IPD [6].
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2. The mathematics behind the test
Incorporating rigorous pure mathematics into real-world situations can be
a subtle problem. To illustrate this let’s consider an example from popular
culture.
2.1. A Beautiful Mind. Our quiz is based on the notion of equilibrium
strategy and the Nobel-prize winning theorem of John Nash [5]. To famil-
iarize the uninitiated with this notion, we recall a scene from the film, “A
Beautiful Mind,” based on Nash’s life and work, which attempts to depict
Nash’s thereom. The scene is set in a bar and begins with Nash’s charac-
ter and his buddies watching a group of attractive women enter the bar.
One woman is exceptionally beautiful, and the men begin discussing their
best strategies to court her. After a moment of reflection Nash’s character
realizes that the “best” tactic is for the men to each approach one of the
averagely attractive women, rather than trying to court the exceptionally
beautiful woman. One sees this depicted in the film as each man leaves
with one of the averagely beautiful women, and the exceptionally beautiful
woman is alone. Is this really an equilibrium strategy according to Nash’s
Theorem?
Let’s recall the definitions and statement of Nash’s celebrated theorem.
An n-person non-cooperative game is based on the absence of coalitions
or communication between players. The ith player has a set of mi pure
strategies, each of which can be identified with one of the standard unit
vectors in Rmi . The set of mixed strategies corresponds to a probability
distribution over pure strategies and can be identified with the convex subset
Si ∼=
x = (x1, . . . , xmi) ∈ Rmi : xj ≥ 0∀j,
mi∑
j=1
xj = 1
 .
The total strategy space over all players can then be identified with
S ∼=
n∏
i=1
Si ⊂ RN , N =
n∑
i=1
mi.
Each player has an associated payoff function ℘i : S → R. The payoff
functions are linear in the strategy of the respective player. That is, if all
other players’ strategies are fixed, the payoff function is a linear function
from Si → R. Typically, the payoff function is assumed to be continuous on
S. In [5], Nash proved that for every such game, there exists at least one
“equilibrium strategy,” which in the following sense is the “best” strategy
for all players. For s ∈ S, let ℘i(s;σ; i) denote the payoff for the strategy
in which the ith player’s strategy according to s is replaced by σ ∈ Si. An
equilibrium strategy s satisfies
℘i(s) ≥ ℘i(s;σi; i) ∀σi ∈ Si, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
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In other words, if a single player changes his strategy, he cannot increase his
payoff.
Theorem 1 (Nash [5]). For any n-person non-cooperative game such that
the payoff functions are linear in the strategy of each player and are continu-
ous functions on the total strategy space there exists at least one equilibrium
strategy.
To analyze the scene from the film, for simplicity, let’s assume there are
2 men, denoted by man 1 and man 2, and 3 women, one denoted by “G”
(for gorgeous) and two denoted by “P” (for pretty). Each man has two pure
strategies: “G” which corresponds to courting the gorgeous woman, and
“P” which corresponds to courting one of the pretty women. First, consider
the following payoff matrix:
G P
G (-1, -1) (1, 0)
P (0, 1) (0, 0)
The payoff matrix means:
℘1(G,G) = ℘2(G,G) = −1, ℘1(G,P ) = 1, ℘2(G,P ) = 0,
℘1(P,G) = 0, ℘2(P,G) = 1, ℘1(P, P ) = ℘2(P, P ) = 0.
The interpretation is that if both men attempt to court the gorgeous woman,
they are both unsuccessful, indicated by a negative payoff −1. If man 1
chooses “G,” and man 2 chooses “P,” then both men’s courtships are suc-
cessful, and we consider man 1 to be positively rewarded indicated by a score
of 1, and man 2 is merely content, indicated by a neutral score of 0. If both
men choose “P” we presume that they each court a different pretty woman
and are both successful, so they are both content, indicated by a score of 0.
The game is symmetric. It’s straightforward to generalize to n + 1 women
and n men, but this is not necessary to illustrate our point.
By Nash’s Theorem, there exists at least one equilibrium strategy, and
in this simple example it’s possible to compute the equilibrium strategy or
strategies. If the probabilities that man 1 and 2 choose “G” are denoted by
x, and y, respectively, then the total strategy space is
S ∼= {(x, y) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1}.
The payoff functions are
℘1(x, y) = x− 2xy, ℘2(x, y) = y − 2xy.
Exercise 1. Determine the equilibrium strategies.
Hopefully we’ve all arrived at the same answer to the exercise: the equi-
librium strategies are (x = 0, y = 1) and (x = 1, y = 0). Does this fit with
the film? The first equilibrium strategy means that man 1 courts a pretty
woman, and man 2 courts the gorgeous woman. The second equilibrium
4 KERSTIN BEVER AND JULIE ROWLETT
strategy is the other way around. This doesn’t fit with the film at all! Ac-
cording to the film, the equilibrium strategy should be that both men court
pretty women, which corresponds to x = y = 0.
This is rather perplexing. One explanation is that Hollywood just doesn’t
understand math. That may very well be the case. However, as mathemati-
cians, we ought to know that things aren’t always what they seem. Is it
possible to resolve the mathematical definition of equilibrium strategy with
the scene depicted in the film?
Exercise 2. What is a payoff matrix for a two-player symmetric game with
two pure strategies G and P with the interpretations described above, such
that the equilibrium strategy is x = y = 0?
How do we begin? Let’s denote the pure strategies as above by G and P.
The payoffs are symmetric, so ℘1(G,P ) = ℘2(P,G), ℘1(P, P ) = ℘2(P, P ),
and ℘1(G,G) = ℘2(G,G). The unknown payoff matrix for the film is:
G P
G (a, a) (c, d)
P (d, c) (b, b)
The payoff functions are
℘1(x, y) = xya+ x(1− y)c+ (1− x)yd+ (1− x)(1− y)b,
℘2(x, y) = xya+ y(1− x)c+ (1− y)xd+ (1− y)(1− x)b.
The payoffs for the strategy x = y = 0 are ℘1(0, 0) = b = ℘2(0, 0). In order
for this to be an equilibrium strategy, the following must hold:
℘1(x, 0) ≤ ℘1(0, 0), ∀x ∈ [0, 1]; ℘2(0, y) ≤ ℘2(0, 0), ∀y ∈ [0, 1].
This is equivalent to:
xc+ (1− x)b ≤ b ∀x ∈ [0, 1], yc+ (1− y)b ≤ b ,∀y ∈ [0, 1],
which holds iff
c ≤ b.
This means that the payoff associated to successfully courting the gorgeous
woman is less than or equal to the payoff associated to successfully courting
a pretty woman! This would seem inconsistent with the film which indicates
that each man would be most content if he successfully courted the gorgeous
woman.
This leads us to the same initial conclusion: Hollywood simply doesn’t
understand the math. Well, perhaps there is a logical explanation. What if
b = c? The payoff matrix would be
G P
G (a, a) (c, d)
P (d, c) (c, c)
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Now, clearly a < c, because successfully courting the gorgeous woman is
a more positive outcome than unsuccessfully courting her. It is also natu-
ral to presume that d < c, as the film indicates that successfully courting
the gorgeous woman while the other man courts a pretty woman is more
desirable than the other way around. How can we make sense of the fact
that ℘1(P, P ) = ℘2(P, P ) = ℘1(G,P ) = ℘2(P,G) = c? Instead of thinking
about the relationship between the men and the women, let’s think about
the relationship between the men. They are shown as buddies in the film. If
man 1 courts the gorgeous woman while his buddy, man 2, courts a pretty
woman, then although man 1 might be very happy about the outcome, man
2 might be jealous. Jealously can have unpleasant consequences. Now, on
the other hand, if both men court a pretty woman, then nobody will be
jealous! So, perhaps jealously explains why the above payoff matrix with
d < a < c is what the filmmakers had in mind. There’s still a glitch with
this explanation. You’ll see what we mean if you do the following exercise.
Exercise 3. Are there any other equilibrium strategies?
Well, yes. The strategy (G,G) is also an equilibrium strategy, and this is
clearly not the best outcome since both men end up alone. So, it’s still not
entirely clear whether or not the filmmakers understand the mathematics.
Now let’s move on to our test which is consistent with rigorous mathematics!
3. The Compatibility Test
3.1. Instructions. Instead of simply deciding on one of three options as is
typical for love quizzes, both partners have to fill in a matrix consisting of
three slots:
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
Outcome A
Outcome B
Outcome C
Partners # 1 and #2 each separately choose a number between 0 and 10
to fill in each of the slots (a/α, b/β, c/γ), such that the numbers add up to
10. For example, you could choose 0, 1, 9; or 2, 3, 5; or 3, 3, 4. How do you
choose the numbers?
(1) For the a/α slot, choose a number from 0 (never/completely dis-
agree) to 10 (always/completely agree) to describe how likely Out-
come A is.
(2) For the b/β slot, choose a number between 0 (never/completely dis-
agree) to 10 (always/completely agree) to describe how likely Out-
come B is.
(3) For the c/γ slot, choose a number between 0 (never/completely dis-
agree) to 10 (always/completely agree) to describe how likely Out-
come C is.
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It is important when taking the test that the partners do not see each
other’s answers! For this reason, we recommend printing out two copies
of the following section and separately filling in your numbers, leaving the
numbers of your partner’s responses blank.
3.2. The test questions.
Question 1. You have decided to spend the weekend together. How does it
go?
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
It’s a blast!
It’s not my first choice, but it’s nice.
Well, at least my partner is happy.
Question 2. How do you feel about your sex life?
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
Sex is just the way I like it!
I’m satisfied.
I am sexually frustrated.
Question 3. How do you and your partner manage your careers and chores?
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
Career and chores are just the way I like them.
I’ve had to make some compromises.
I’ve made significant sacrifices for my partner.
Question 4. Your partner has fallen ill. What happens?
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
I rarely catch whatever s/he has.
I take care of him/her and might get sick.
I stay by his/her side and get sick.
Question 5. How often do you see your family and your in-laws?
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
Exactly as much as I would like.
It’s a compromise but we manage to get along.
I don’t see my own family enough.
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Question 6. If you are in a long relationship, your circle of friends often
change. Whose friends do you tend to see?
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
I spend as much time with my friends as I want.
I spend less time with my friends but still keep up.
I rarely see my old friends.
Question 7. How is your financial situation?
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
Great.
I can’t always spend the way I’d like, but it’s fine.
We have financial problems.
Question 8. Have you and your partner talked about having children?
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
Yes and I’m happy with our decisions.
We will discuss it eventually.
That is up to my partner to decide.
Question 9. How do you feel about your lifestyle in terms of health, fitness,
and physical appearance?
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
I am totally happy.
Fine.
It is not what it used to be.
Question 10. You have agreed to spend a cozy night at home watching TV.
How does it go?
Partner # 1
a
b
c
Partner # 2
α
β
γ
I love what we watch.
We compromise on something.
My partner chooses what we watch.
4. How to evaluate the test
The notion of equilibrium strategy was introduced for non-cooperative
games. You may be thinking
Why use non-cooperative game theory for a compatibility
test?
Although it may seem counter-intuitive, there is a quite natural reason.
Most everyday decisions are made spontaneously with little or no discussion.
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M H
M (0, 0) (1, -1)
H (-1, 1) (0, 0)
Figure 1. My way or the highway?
People naturally tend to act in their best self-interest. This is similar to non-
cooperative games in which each player acts independently to maximize his
own payoff without communication with the other players.
The quiz is based on a simple, two-player, two-move, symmetric, zero-
sum game with one dominant strategy. We use this game to quantify a snap
decision made by a couple without discussion. Strategy “M” corresponds to
“my way,” which means that player does exactly what s/he would like to
do. Strategy “H” corresponds to “the highway,” which means that player
does the opposite of what s/he would like to do. The payoff ℘1(M,M) =
℘2(M,M) means that if both partners make a snap decision which fits with
each of their personal interests, then they are both equally content, and
neither one nor the other is dominant, expressed by a neutral payoff (0) to
both partners. The payoffs ℘1(M,H) = 1, ℘2(M,H) = −1 means that if the
decision favors Partner # 1’s interest and is not consistent with Partner #
2’s interest, Partner # 1 has a positive payoff +1, whereas Partner # 2 has
a negative payoff -1. If both partners’ interests are not met, then neither is
dominant, expressed by a neutral payoff of 0 to each.
How can such a simple game quantify happiness and balance in a rela-
tionship?
Exercise 4. What is the equilibrium strategy for the above game?
The unique equilibrium strategy is (M,M). This corresponds to both
partners having it “my way.” Well, that’s clearly the best possible scenario!
This would mean that neither partner dominates, and yet both are totally
happy with their life choices and activities together. We designed the test
to quantify the following two characteristics of a relationship.
(1) Is the relationship balanced, or is one of the partners dominant? If
so, who?
(2) How happy are both partners with their lives in the relationship?
How does our test relate to the model game? Let x denote the probability
that Partner # 1 has it “my way” and y denote the probability that Partner
# 2 has it “my way.” Then corresponding payoffs to each partner,
℘1(x, y) = x− y, ℘2(x, y) = y − x.
The test questions were designed to measure the cumulative probability that
each partner has it “my way” or “the highway.” For a general test with 10
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questions on a 10-point scale as in §3, we compute
X :=
10∑
t=1
a(t), and Y :=
10∑
t=1
α(t).
What do the above sums mean? If we divide each by 100, then x = X/100
and y = Y/100 are the cumulative probabilities that each partner has it his
or her way. The payoffs for the game “my way or the highway” are then
℘1 = x− y, ℘2 = y − x.
Since it is easier to work with whole numbers, we use X and Y and compute
P1 := X − Y, P2 := Y −X.
(1) If P1 > P1, then the first partner is dominant. The larger the
difference, the more partner # 1 dominates.
(2) If P2 > P1, then the second partner is dominant. The larger the
difference, the more partner # 2 dominates
Your relationship could be in balance, but that doesn’t have to mean that
you are happy. For example, if both partners answer 0 to each a/α slot and
answers 10 to each c/γ slot, that means that although neither dominates,
neither partner is pleased with the outcome of the situations posed in the
test questions. This is where the second parameter comes into play. The
more both of you feel that you’re doing the things you like to do, the more
satisfied you are. This is why it makes sense to look at the following numbers:
K1 :=
10∑
t=1
a(t)− c(t), and K2 :=
10∑
t=1
α(t)− γ(t).
(1) The larger K1 is, the more the first partner feels that s/he does what
s/he likes.
(2) The larger K2 is, the more the second partner feels that s/he does
what s/he likes.
(3) The overall satisfaction in the a relationship is given by
K := K1 + K2.
The larger this number is, the more both partners are doing what
they’d like to do.
The unique Nash equilibrium strategy for the model game corresponds
to P1 = P2 = 0, and K having the maximum possible value which for the
test presented here is 200. Our test measures how close a couple is to this
perfectly balanced happiness (see Figure 2).
4.1. Modifying the test. The two main parameters quantified by our test
are:
(1) Is the relationship balanced, or is one partner more dominant? If so,
who?
(2) How satisfied are both partners in the relationship?
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Nash Equilibrium
Figure 2. For the two-player, symmetric, zero-sum game
“my way or the highway,” the unique equilibrium strategy is
when both players execute “my way” with probability 1. Let-
ting the respective probabilities that partners 1 and 2 execute
“my way” be (x, y), then in the magenta region y > x, which
corresponds to ℘2 > ℘1 in the test, and the second partner
is dominant. In the cyan region, x > y, which corresponds
to ℘1 > ℘2 in the test, and the first partner is dominant.
The relationship is balanced along the diagonal line x = y.
Both partners are maximally happy at the point (1, 1), which
corresponds to the maximum possible value of K.
We chose questions to assess sex-life, family and friends, health and
lifestyle, career, and finances. For more accurate results, the test can be
altered to consist of as many questions on as many topics as desired. A
further variation of the test is to allow each partner to choose the total of
the answer column for each question. The default total is 10, but if a certain
question is more important to the partner, s/he can make that question’s
column have a higher sum like 50. On the other hand, if a certain question
is really not so important to him or her, then s/he could assign the column’s
total to be a smaller number like 5.
To evaluate this type of test one first computes
X :=
T∑
t=1
a(t), and Y :=
T∑
t=1
α(t),
where T is the total number of test questions. Next, these are normalized by
the weights of the questions. If Partner # 1 assigns p(t) points to question
t, and Partner # 2 assigns q(t) points to question t, we compute
W1 :=
T∑
t=1
p(t), W2 :=
T∑
t=1
q(t).
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Then we define
℘1 :=
X
W1
− Y
W2
, ℘2 :=
Y
W2
− X
W1
.
The numbers XW1 and
Y
W2
are, respectively, the cumulative probabilities that
Partners # 1 and # 2 execute strategy “my way” in the “my way or the
highway” game, and ℘1, ℘2 are their respective payoffs.
(1) If ℘1 > ℘2, then the first partner dominates, and the larger ℘1−℘2,
the more Partner # 1 dominates.
(2) If ℘2 > ℘1, then the second partner dominates, and the larger ℘2 −
℘1, the more Partner # 2 dominates.
To compute the overall satisfaction of the pair, we compute
K1 :=
T∑
t=1
a(t)− c(t)
p(t)
, and K2 :=
T∑
t=1
α(t)− γ(t)
q(t)
.
(1) The larger K1 is, the more the first partner feels that s/he does what
s/he likes.
(2) The larger K2 is, the more the second partner feels that s/he does
what s/he likes.
(3) The overall satisfaction in the a relationship is given by
K := K1 + K2.
The larger this number is, the more both partners are doing what
they’d like to do based on what they feel is most important. In this
case, the largest possible values of K1 and K2 are both T , and the
largest possible value of K is therefore 2T .
With a suitable choice of test questions, our test could also be used to
evaluate relationships between business partners, employees, political part-
ners, or any situation involving two (or more) people who behave in their
best self interest. It is also possible to create tests based on iterated games
as in [1].
5. The Iterated Dating Dilemma
Have you been in a relationship for a length of time? In any relation-
ship there is give and take. We can describe this mathematically using the
prisoner’s dilemma. Two crooks have committed a crime and have gotten
caught! They are locked in a prison cell together before they are taken sepa-
rately for questioning. They agree in the prison cell that they won’t rat each
other out. This is known as cooperation (C). However, when each prisoner
goes off for questioning, he has the chance to defect (D) by claiming he is
innocent, and his partner is solely responsible for the crime.
The payoff matrix (Figure 3) means that if both prisoners cooperate,
they both receive an equal payoff of W . In terms of give and take within
a couple, we identify the strategy C with giving, and the strategy D with
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C D
C (W,W) (Z,Y)
D (Y,Z) (X,X)
Figure 3. Payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma and the IDD
taking. So if both partners give, then they both receive an equal payoff W .
In the prisoner dilemma, if one prisoner cooperates but his partner in crime
defects, then the prisoner who cooperated gets slapped with a longer prison
sentence than the defector. So the payoff for cooperating Z is smaller than
Y , the payoff for defecting. Similarly, if one person in a relationship gives,
corresponding to strategy C, while the other person in the relationship takes,
corresponding to strategy D, then the payoff to the giver is lower than the
payoff to the taker. Finally, if both prisoners defect, then they both get a
longer sentence than if they cooperate, so the payoff for mutual defection
X is smaller than the payoff for mutual cooperation W . Similarly, if both
people in the relationship take, then their payoff is lower than if they both
give. Consequently, the payoffs satisfy
Y > W > X > Z.
In the prisoner’s dilemma it is also customary to assume that the expected
value of cooperating is higher than the expected value of defecting. If a pris-
oner defects, a neutral expectation of his partner in crime is 1/2 probability
defecting and 1/2 probability cooperating. Hence, the expected payoff of
defecting is
1
2
(Y + Z) ,
and we assume the payoff for cooperating is better than the expected payoff
of defecting so
W >
1
2
(Y + Z) .
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma the “game” is repeated. We can use
the dynamics of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma to study the dynamics of
give and take in a relationship, which we call the “iterated dating dilemma
(IDD).” Of course, we are simplifying things a bit here, for example by as-
suming the payoffs are symmetric and remain constant over time. Nonethe-
less we have found that analyzing the long-term dynamics of give and take
in a relationship using the iterated prisoner’s dilemma leads to interesting
results.
At each round of the game we assume that each person remembers what
happened in the previous round. Press and Dyson proved that it doesn’t
matter whether one person can remember more than the other, which game-
theoretically means that a long-memory player has no advantage over a
memory-one player (someone who can only remember the previous date)
[6]. This in itself is rather interesting and a bit of a relief! It means that to
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ensure our best possible payoff over time, we just need to remember what
happened last time.
Let’s call the two people in the couple Pat and Gene. At each iteration of
the IDD there are four possibilities for the previous outcome: (C,C), (C,D),
(D,C), (D,D). Pat’s strategy is p = (p1, p2, p3, p4) which corresponds to
her probability of cooperating (giving) under each of the previous outcomes.
Gene’s strategy is q = (q1, q2, q3, q4) (c.f. Fig. 1 [6]) which corresponds to his
probability of cooperating under each of the previous outcomes. Hauert and
Schuster [3] showed that these probabilities can be used to determine the
expected outcome for each player. The unexpected fact proven in [6] is that
there exist strategies for Pat and Gene such that Pat can control Gene’s
expected payoff, and/or Gene can control Pat’s expected payoff. These
are known as zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, because these strategies are
precisely those such that the determinant of a certain matrix vanishes; we
refer interested readers to the proofs and calculations in [6] and focus here
on the implications of those results. Press and Dyson showed that Pat (or
Gene) can force any particular score for Gene (or Pat) regardless of what
the other person does. They also showed that it is not possible for Pat or
Gene to unilaterally set his or her own score.
Although it is impossible for Pat to control her own expected payoff,
she can control Gene’s, and vice-versa. This would seem to indicate that
whereas one can influence his or her partner’s happiness by his or her choice
of behaviors, one cannot unilaterally control one’s own happiness in a rela-
tionship. Moreover, since a longer memory player has no advantage over a
memory-one player, it suffices to remember what happened “last time” to
make one’s best decision for “next time.”
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